The introduction of the euro marks a milestone in the process of European financial market integration. This paper analyzes the implications of the euro for cross-border banking activities. A portfolio model is used which captures the role of banks as providers of informational and of risk-diversification services. By eliminating exchange rate risks, the euro enhances the incentives of banks to expand within Euroland. Yet, while the currency bias in bank portfolios will be eliminated, the home bias will remain. Implications of market integration for the risk-taking and the monitoring of banks are not clear-cut.
MOTIVATION
The introduction of the euro at the beginning of 1999 has been the single most important change affecting European financial markets for the foreseeable future. Financial markets have already undergone profound changes during the past two decades. Capital controls within Europe and vis-a Á -vis the rest of the world have been lifted; the Second Banking Directive has leveled the playing field for banks in Europe. The advent of the euro completes these processes and, at the same time, may serve as a catalyst of future institutional changes within Europe's financial markets. The euro is thus likely to affect the way in which financial markets operate and to impact upon capital mobility. 1 The magnitude of these effects, in turn, will have important implications for other policy areas such as the effectiveness and the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies (see e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1998) .
This paper provides a framework in which the implications of the euro for capital mobility within Europe can be analyzed. Costs of cross-border transactions such as information costs are introduced into a standard mean± variance framework in which banks can hold both assets and liabilities at home and abroad. Although the focus of the analysis is on the portfolio choices of commercial banks, applications to other investment decisions which involve transaction and information costs are conceivable.
The impact of information costs on cross-border capital flows has been shown already before. Montgomery (1990) , for instance, considers a two-country model, in which one intermediary is present in each country. Owing to asymmetries in information, intermediaries cannot observe each other's monitoring efforts. Hence, under-investment occurs because the intermediary which has access to a greater (exogenous) supply of funds is less willing to lend cross-border. The country with lower initial savings is confined to lower investment, which can explain the empirical observation first made by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and confirmed by many subsequent studies that domestic saving and investment are highly correlated. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) likewise show the impact of asymmetries in information for the efficiency of the international allocation of capital. In a similar vein, Gehrig (1993) argues that asymmetries in information can be one explanation for the home bias typically observed in international asset portfolios (Tesar and Werner, 1992) . In his model, investors receive noisy signals about returns on assets at home and abroad, and the average precision is higher for domestic than for foreign signals.
The present paper analyzes cross-border activities of banks in a portfolio framework. The baseline model is presented in Section 3. The model allows us to take exchange rate effects into account explicitly, and to model the informational role of banks as well as their risk-pooling functions. In Section 4, the model will be used to derive implications of the euro for cross-border banking activities, and thus for capital mobility, and for monitoring incentives. Section 5 discusses the implications of financial market integration for the risktaking of banks. Section 6 concludes and summarizes the main findings. We start with a brief summary of stylized facts on the cross-border activities of commercial banks (Section 2).
STYLIZED FACTS
In Europe, the integration of financial markets has taken three forms: Crossborder capital flows have become fully liberalized with the successive abolition of capital controls up until the early 1990s. Trade in financial services has been deregulated by applying the home country principle, which is enshrined in the Second Banking Directive of 1992, to the financial services industry. In addition, low entry barriers for outside financial institutions make European financial markets highly contestable. Still, it is commonly asserted that the full competitive impact of the creation of a single market for capital lags behind expectations as market shares of foreign banks are low and as inefficiencies in some segments of the European banking industry prevail (Prati and Schinasi, 1997; McCauley and White, 1997) .
Despite the widely discussed globalization of financial markets and the process of financial market integration in Europe, foreign assets and liabilities of commercial banks account for less than 20 per cent of the balance sheet total in most industrialized countries ( Figure 1 ). Exceptions are countries that host financial centers such as the United Kingdom where foreign business constitutes almost two-thirds of all activities. For the EU countries, French commercial banks also have a relatively large exposure towards foreign countries. The United States is at the lower end of the spectrum as foreign activities of commercial banks have accounted for less than 10 per cent of the balance sheet total in the past 30 years.
Judged on the basis of total foreign activities, the Single Market Program of the European Union (EU), which was completed in 1992, seems to have enforced an already existing trend for an expansion of foreign assets in countries such as France, Italy, or Germany. As regards the importance of foreign liabilities, in contrast, only German and French banks have increased foreign activities after 1992 while Italian banks have reduced their reliance on foreign funds.
For all countries, the figures presented in Figure 1 include not only loans and deposits granted to and raised from abroad, but also securitized assets and liabilities. Hence, the data give the upper bound for the share of cross-border lending and borrowing in the retail market. Data for Germany on the foreign investment position of commercial banks show that, at the end of 1998, claims on banks dominated (almost 50 per cent of total foreign claims), followed by claims on non-banks (27 per cent), and other asset holdings (23 per cent) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999) . For most countries of the EU, calculations of the Bank for International Settlements show a share of foreign lending in total lending to non-banks of less than 10 per cent (White, 1998) . Hence, despite the creation of a Single Market for capital in Europe, retail markets remain largely segmented (European Commission, 1997, p. 4) . For Germany, a regional breakdown of assets and liabilities reveals that, since the late 1970s, activities in EU countries have expanded quite rapidly. 2 By the end of 1998, liabilities vis-a Á -vis EU countries accounted for about 70 per cent of the total; claims for about 60 per cent. In the early 1990s, the respective shares stood at 40±45 per cent. Hence, a strong regional`bias' in German banks' foreign activities is visible. Activities in the US are much less important for German banks but still account for 6±10 per cent of the total. Interestingly, it does not seem as if the Single Market Program has had an impact on the overall trend to expand European operations.
Finally, it has been argued that financial liberalization and integration of financial markets could lower the screening activities of commercial banks (Aizenman, 1998; Gehrig, 1998) . This might show up in an increased need to provision for loan losses. Table 1 presents selected data from the income statements of commercial banks. It shows that real returns on equity (ROE) for commercial banks in Europe have on average been lower between 1991 and 1995 than for banks in the United States while loan loss provisions have been higher. This could be interpreted in two ways. Either, external conditions could be the same for the two banking systems but US banks have superior riskmanagement systems. Or, banks in Europe may be under greater competitive pressure and would thus have faced different external conditions than banks in the US. In the following, we will present a formal model which shows the factors determining foreign activities of commercial banks and which explains the relatively low shares of foreign activities. In addition, links between market integration and risk-taking of commercial banks will be analyzed.
A PORTFOLIO MODEL OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING
This section presents a simple portfolio model of cross-border banking in which domestic and foreign banks compete both for loans and deposits at home and abroad. 3 The model allows us to gauge the impact of a reduction in exchange rate risk or in information costs on the behavior of commercial banks (and thus on capital flows). The model shows that even though capital flows have in principle been liberalized in Europe, the presence of transactions costs can explain the home bias in banks' portfolios, which is often found empirically. 4 Within the framework of our model, the home bias is captured through costs of cross-border transactions which can be defined in a broad sense as comprising information costs, differences in institutions, and more technical`transportation' costs. A currency bias, in contrast, is reflected by the fact that foreign transactions expose domestic banks to (exchange rate) risks, in particular if liabilities are denominated in the home currency.
The baseline model assumes that trade in financial services (interest payments) and capital flows (changes in loans and deposits abroad) can move freely between two countries. Clients abroad can be serviced from the domestic bank's homebase, but we assume higher transaction costs of cross-border lending and borrowing which captures the fact that these costs are lower if customers are close to the banks.
Two countries with a fixed number of banks (n and n* where i 1, . . ., n, and j 1, . . ., n*) operating in each are considered. Each bank gives out loans and raises deposits on its home market as well as on the foreign market. Yet, banks maintain a presence only in their domestic market, i.e. there is no FDI in banking. In addition to deposits and loans, banks can invest into a riskless security. We start by assuming that markets for the riskless assets are segmented. Changing this assumption will, as will be discussed below, not affect the qualitative results of the analysis. Also, since the previous section has shown the small share of cross-border lending to non-banks, the focus of the 3.
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) use a similar mean±variance approach to determine the impact of macroeconomic risks on the degree of dollarization. In contrast to our approach, which focuses on the portfolio choices of commercial banks, they model directly the behavior of households and firms while assuming banks as passive intermediaries between the two groups of market participants. For earlier applications of portfolio models to the management of foreign exchange risk of banks see Walter (1981) and Grammatikos et al. (1986) . Rother (1997) uses a portfolio model to show the impact of the euro on money demand.
4.
See Lewis (1999) for a recent survey.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 paper will be on corporate loans. Relaxing the assumption that only two types of assets exist would not affect the main message of the paper. Arbitrage between the home and the foreign market is exerted through banks only. This is equivalent to assuming that households and firms face higher transaction costs than banks. Because borrowers and lenders do not interact directly, deposit and lending rates are not identical, the spread between the two reflecting the costs of financial intermediation. These costs are motivated by the presence of asymmetries in information and by a superior allocation of risks, which make trading through intermediaries less costly than direct trades (Allen and Santomero, 1997) .
In principle, there are four different ways in which capital can flow internationally in order to arbitrage between markets. Domestic banks can raise deposits at home or abroad and invest them into foreign and domestic loans. The same options are available for foreign banks. To analyze the resulting portfolio choices of banks, we assume that all contracts are denominated in local currency. When calculating returns on activities abroad, exchange rate risks have thus to be taken into account. Furthermore, we consider only one period. At the beginning of the period, the bank chooses its optimal portfolio structure. Hereby, it must observe its balance sheet restriction, which is given by bank i's loans on the domestic and on the foreign market and the riskless asset (R):
where W initial wealth, DL domestic deposits (loans), and D Ã L Ã foreign deposits (loans) in domestic currency terms. At the end of the period, returns are realized. The expected profit of a representative domestic bank i is thus given by:
where e expected rate of change in the exchange rate (price of foreign currency in domestic currency terms), r L Y r D expected interest rates on loans and deposits, r F interest rate on the risk-free asset, c variable costs of making loans and raising deposits 5 and K" i monitoring costs with
Since we assume that banks bear the exchange rate risk, a depreciation of the domestic currency ( e b 0) raises both the return on loans abroad and the costs of deposits abroad. Exchange rate changes are stochastic with a standard deviation ' e b 0, and are taken as exogenous by the banks. A similar profit function can be derived for the foreign bank. Upon substituting the balance 5.
Note that these variable costs add to the interest cost of deposits while they lower the interest rate earned on loans.
sheet restriction (1) into (2), one obtains:
Raising deposits and granting loans is costly for banks. These costs can be motivated as resource inputs of the banks in connection with handling loan applications, maintaining a branch network, or performing payments services. The costs of supplying financial services internationally, in turn, are likely to be higher than in a national context. This is because institutional and regulatory differences exist between financial systems, because domestic banks are less familiar with the pool of foreign borrowers, 6 or simply because foreign transactions imply`transportation' costs. Hence, for domestic banks, the following inequalities hold: c iYD`c Ã iYD and c iYL`c Ã iYL . The reverse relationship holds for foreign banks: c jYD b c Ã jYD and c jYL b c Ã jYL . Moreover, domestic (foreign) banks are assumed to have a comparative advantage in the provision of domestic (foreign) financial services, i.e. c iYD`cjYD and c Ã iYD b c Ã jYD . A similar condition applies to the loan market. Notice that these conditions are likely to prevail even if technological progress reduces the technical costs of cross-border payments services since institutional differences and information costs are converging much more slowly.
In addition to the expected profits of their activities, banks also care about the risk of their portfolio:
where x i denote portfolio shares and COV covariances of returns. The objective function of the representative bank is increasing in expected profits and decreasing in portfolio variance:
This risk aversion of banks could be endogenized by assuming that banks face a positive probability of insolvency, and that insolvencies are costly. Baltensperger and Milde (1987) , for example, argue that in the case of bankruptcy banks have to cover costs of reorganization and administration. The same 6. Empirical evidence on the determinants of foreign banking activities often shows that banks tend to follow their customers abroad but only slowly start to deal with domestic clients (see, for instance, Seth et al., 1998) . This can be taken as evidence for the hypothesis that foreign banks face an information disadvantage vis-a Á -vis domestic banks in the local market.
qualitative results are obtained if banks have to meet an equity requirement (Helbling, 1992) . 7 Internationally accepted banking standards in fact require banks to hold equity to cover open foreign exchange positions: in 1995, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision suggested special capital charges applying to banks' foreign currency risks (BIS, 1996) . Before analyzing optimal portfolio choices of banks, it is useful to distinguish interest rate and exchange rate risks. Interest rate risks arise because the return on lending activities is assumed to be stochastic. For simplicity, we ignore uncertainty about deposit rates. Banks are assumed to be able to reduce their exposure to lending risks by investing in screening activities which allow them to better classify prospective borrowers. 8 Following Baltensperger and Milde (1987, p. 169n) , we assume that ex-post screening of loan applicants helps banks to reduce the standard deviation of returns from lending although not allowing them to fully eliminate lending risks:
iYL standard deviation of loan returns for the domestic bank when lending to domestic (foreign) clients, ' jYL ' Ã jYL standard deviation of loan returns for the foreign bank when lending to domestic (foreign) clients, and " i " j monitoring activities of domestic (foreign) banks. Domestic banks can be assumed to have a comparative advantage in classifying domestic borrowers (and vice versa) because of closer customer relationships or greater familiarity with the business conditions in a national environment:
Whereas the volatility of domestic returns depends on characteristics of the borrower population only, foreign activities also expose banks to exchange rate risk. The standard deviations of interest rates are thus given by:
with COV Le COVr Ã L Y e & Le ' L ' e covariances of foreign lending rate and exchange rate changes & Le coefficient of correlation). The standard deviation of domestic currency returns of foreign lending is therefore below the sum of lending and exchange rate risk (Elton and Gruber, 1995, p. 266) . If & Le is sufficiently small in absolute terms, the risk of foreign lending increases if exchange rate volatility goes up:
The key assumption is that banks hold equity by the amount needed to cover the expected insolvency cost. Hence, in the case of insolvency, equity is zero. In the present setting, this special role of equity has not been taken into account explicitly. 8.
Notice that there are no asymmetries in information between banks and firms in this specification. This assumption will be relaxed later on.
The bank's optimal demand for asset m is obtained by maximizing (4) with respect to loans and deposits. The first-order conditions are thus given by:
and, by denoting the degree of the bank's relative risk aversion with
optimal portfolio shares can be obtained from:
where V À1 is the inverse of the variance±covariance matrix of excess returns " r i . We assume that there is no uncertainty with regard to the magnitude of variable costs, and that V is distributed normally. The vector of excess returns is given by:
Exchange rate changes are assumed to be relatively small, i.e. " r iYL Y " r Ã iYL b 0Y " r iYD Y " r Ã iYD`0 . Thus knowing the bank's relative risk aversion, the expected excess returns, and the covariances between risky assets, its optimal demand for each of the assets in terms of mean±variance efficiency can be determined.
Under the assumption that excess returns on loans (deposits) are positive (negative) and that all elements in the variance±covariance matrix are positive, one obtains negative portfolio shares for deposits and positive portfolio shares for loans. An increase in the excess return of an individual security increases the share of this security in the portfolio (and reduces the absolute value if the security is a liability). An increase in the variance of a security reduces its portfolio share. These results are hardly surprising and follow the standard literature (Freixas and Rochet, 1998; Hart and Jaffee, 1974 ).
Yet, the first important result from equation (8) is that unless their vectors of excess returns are identical, domestic and foreign banks will hold different 9.
If, contrary to our maintained assumption, markets for riskless assets were segmented, excess returns on domestic but not on foreign assets or liabilities would depend on exchange rate risks as r F r Ã F e would hold. portfolios. For all practical purposes, this will be the case. This result will also hold for different types of domestic banks to the extent that they have different cost structures. Hence, the separation theorem, which says that all banks should hold the same co-linear portfolio irrespective of their degree of risk aversion (Hart and Jaffee, 1974) , does apply only within sub-groups of homogeneous banks but not between them. 10 Under certain parameter constellations, some assets may not even be traded (Stulz, 1981) .
IMPACT OF THE EURO

Portfolio decisions and the euro
The above framework can be used to analyze the reaction of banks to changing market opportunities such as the introduction of the euro and the concomitant elimination of exchange rate risk within Europe. For this purpose, note that the optimal supply of domestic and foreign loans (
The response of domestic loans to a decline in exchange rate risk is given by
Because U HH`0 holds in the optimum, the sign of the numerator of this term on the RHS determines the sign of the LHS:
This result is qualitatively identical to that of Stulz (1981) who assumes that domestic investors have to pay a tax proportional to their holdings of foreign assets. In our framework, this tax corresponds to the variable costs of cross-border transactions. Likewise, Gehrig (1993) concludes that a market portfolio ceases to exist when asymmetries in information are allowed for.
where the prime denotes the first derivative with respect to the standard deviation of the exchange rate. Without additional assumptions, the effects of a change in exchange rate risk on the supply of loans are undetermined. 11 Assuming that the indirect effects, stemming from the elimination of exchange rate risk on the second derivative of the utility function, are small, only the sign of the first terms on the RHS in (10a) and (10b) matters. Assuming that all correlation coefficients are positive, we get the following conditions for domestic and foreign loans to increase when exchange rate risks decline:
Intuitively, these conditions hold if holdings of foreign deposits provide relatively little hedging effects, either because foreign deposits are relatively small or because the effect on portfolio risk is relatively small. Notice that the effect on foreign lending works directly via the reduction of exchange rate risks whereas the effect on domestic lending arises only indirectly via the correlation of loan returns. 12 A negative response of lending activities to a decline in exchange rate risks becomes more likely if domestic and foreign loans are negatively correlated (& 13`0 ). In this case, exchange rate risks in domestic lending decisions would serve as a hedge against exchange rate risks stemming from the deposit business. With the elimination of exchange rate risks, the need to hedge would diminish, however, and the supply of loans could be affected negatively.
We have so far assumed that excess returns on loans are positive such that banks offer a positive amount of loans in equilibrium. It is conceivable, however, that the costs of offering loans to foreign customers are prohibitively expensive and that the net yield from going abroad turns negative. In this case, 11.
Note that we have derived these comparative static results under the assumption that the indirect effects of changes in exchange rate risks on the other choice parameters are sufficiently small and can thus be neglected.
12.
Similar conditions can be derived if we reverse the assumption on the integration of the markets for risk-free assets by assuming full integration. In this case, exchange rate changes have a direct effect on the excess return of domestic rather than foreign assets and liabilities.
[ ] ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 a short-sale constraint would become binding and " L Ã i 0. This has at least three implications. First, even though the elimination of exchange rate risks may tend to increase the incentives to go abroad, this parameter change might not be sufficient to induce activities in the foreign market. Second, the fact that other market participants face higher transaction costs than commercial banks can explain why cross-border capital flows are intermediated mainly through banks. Third, banks themselves may decide to hedge foreign exchange risks through instruments (e.g. bonds, derivatives) other than commercial loans which involve lower transaction costs.
Moreover, when discussing the comparative±static effects of the introduction of the euro, we cannot assume that all parameters remain constant. At the same time, an assessment of the impact of the euro on the market opportunities of banks going beyond the (direct) exchange rate effect is to a large extent speculative, and the Lucas critique certainly applies. One effect could be that the operating costs of holding foreign assets and liabilities may fall as the costs of cross-border transactions decline, thus increasing the net return from going abroad. This would increase banks' incentives to offer both deposits and loans abroad. 13 In the medium to long run, however, the expansionary effect of the euro is not that clear-cut. If the introduction of a common currency fosters the integration of both real and financial markets, it may raise the correlation between rates of return on assets in the euro zone. Higher covariances of domestic and foreign assets would lower the incentives to expand across borders as European loans would provide a poorer hedge against countryspecific risks. Overall, we have thus two effects (reduced risks and higher net returns) which would cause an expansion of activities within Euroland and one effect (higher correlations) which may work in the opposite direction. An alternative scenario would be that industries become more concentrated across Europe which would imply a decrease in return correlations across countries. Cross-border banking activities would thus become relatively more attractive.
In summary, the introduction of the euro eliminates the currency bias within Euroland. In terms of exchange rate risks, Euroland assets become perfect substitutes for domestic assets. This should promote the expansion of banks within Euroland. At the same time, the potential for diversification within Euroland may be reduced, and the covariance matrix of alternative assets may change. An interesting extension of the present model would thus be to show that these potentially countervailing effects could induce banks to expand outside rather than inside Europe. In addition, it should be noted that the home bias of European investment portfolios will remain to the extent that transaction costs, institutional structures, and information costs adjust only gradually.
13.
Technically, this can be shown by differentiating (9a) and (9b) with respect to operating costs.
Monitoring activities
Apart from choosing optimal amounts of loans, the bank has to decide on the optimal amount of monitoring which can be derived from:
Hence, the marginal costs of monitoring must equal the marginal revenue in terms of a reduction in lending risk:
where the prime denotes the first derivative of the standard deviation with respect to monitoring, i.e. ' H 1 Y ' H 3`0 . The response of the optimal amount of monitoring with respect to a change in exchange rate risk is given by:
where d' 2 3 ad"d' e 0 has been assumed. With U HH`0 , monitoring activities and exchange rate risks are positively related if the term in square brackets is negative. Again, no definite statement is possible because, if correlation coefficients are positive, there are two positive and two negative terms. Assume that monitoring on cross-border loans is relatively ineffective and even, in the extreme, that ' H 3 0. In this case, only the first term in parentheses matters. If it is positive, monitoring is declining in exchange rate risk. The intuition behind this result is that if exchange rate risk declines, the same level of risk can be obtained at a lower cost. Formally, this is the case if
This, in turn, is the same condition as (10a'), i.e. the one required for domestic lending to respond positively to a decline in foreign exchange risks.
MARKET INTEGRATION AND RISK TAKING
As European financial markets are becoming increasingly integrated, the question arises whether integration has an effect on the propensity of banks to take risks. As the previous discussion has shown, a decline in exchange rate risks may in fact reduce monitoring activities of banks. This section discusses recent contributions on the links of monitoring and market integration. Aizenman (1998) , for instance, argues that the integration of financial markets might lead to a decline in economic welfare as it reduces the incentives of banks to screen borrowers. In what follows, we extend his model to take the effects of financial market integration on portfolio risks and on the foreign banking market into account. Following Aizenman, a simple asymmetric information framework is used. Firms can invest an amount L into a project that is successful with probability p and yields a return X and which is a failure and yields a zero return with probability 1 À p. Assuming that projects with a low probability of success yield a lower return if successful as compared to projects with a high probability of success, X can be written as a function of p: X Xp with X H p`0. The probability of success and the return in the good state of the world are thus inversely related. Information about the actual probability of success is private information to entrepreneurs. Outside investors such as banks can observe only the expected value of the payoff.
Consider the firm's profits under self-financing as a benchmark. Normalizing the return on alternative investment opportunities to zero, the firm's profit is given by:
Assuming that the entrepreneur can choose among projects which differ in their probability of success, the first-order condition for a profit maximum is:
dÅ F dp X pX H p 0 14 H Hence, the optimal probability of success under self-financing is given by:
If the firm has no funds to finance investment from internal sources, it has the option to obtain a bank loan at a real interest rate r L . Assuming limited liability of firms, entrepreneurs service their loans only in the good state of the world. Hence, net profits under bank finance are given by:
In this case, firms choose projects with a probability of success:
which is lower than that under self-finance:
This is a standard result of the asymmetric information literature: limited liability implies that the entrepreneur has a preference for risky projects, and over-investment occurs.
As before, the bank can invest into a screening technology. In contrast to the previous analysis, we assume that screening (") not only reduces the variance of project returns but also increases the probability of success, i.e. ' L ' L " and p p" with ' H L`0 and p H b 0. 14 Hence, ex-post monitoring can be used to reduce the impact of adverse incentives of the entrepreneur to choose risky projects.
Moreover, we now assume that screening takes place on a project-by-project basis such that total screening costs are obtained by multiplying variable screening costs k" by the number of loans granted. The efficiency of banks is captured through a shift parameter , i.e. the higher , the less efficient the bank is in using the screening technology. Focusing on the domestic market, we assume that there are n identical banks present in the market. Industry supply of loans and industry demand for deposits are thus given by: L nL i and D nD i . Under autarky, profits of a representative bank are:
where r D domestic deposit rate and L i D i is the balance sheet restriction. In contrast to Aizenman, we assume that banks not only care about expected profits but also about the riskiness of their activities: ' 2 B L i ' L 2 . Hence, the bank's utility is given by: U UÅ B Y ' 2 B . The bank has two choice parameters. Assuming imperfectly competitive markets, it optimizes on the scale of its activities (L) by taking the responses of the other competitors in the market as given (Cournot competition). We thus depart from the analysis of Aizenman who assumes perfectly competitive markets which, in the presence of restrictions on the free flow of capital, seems an unrealistic assumption. In addition, the bank chooses the optimal amount of screening. The first condition for a profit maximum is thus given by:
14.
Notice that these conditions do not hold simultaneously in the general case but rather depend on the strength of adjustment of p and X with respect to ". 
is the elasticity of demand for domestic loans and
is the elasticity of supply for domestic deposits. In the optimum, 1 1an b 0 must hold. Equation (20') can be used to derive the response of the optimal volume of lending ( L i ) to changes in lending and deposit rates as well as to changes in the efficiency of screening: 15
15. In addition, indirect effects which result from the second derivative of the utility function with respect to profits such as
would have to be taken into account. If we assume that direct effects always dominate these indirect effects, we can drop the latter in order to simplify the exposition. because U LL`0 in the profit maximum. 16 Hence, the scale of activities increases in the lending rate and declines in the deposit rate as well as in the degree of inefficiency of the banking system.
In addition to choosing the scale of its activities, the representative bank maximizes profits by choosing screening according to:
where the prime denotes the first derivative with respect to ". Equation (22) can be used to derive the response of banks' optimal screening activities " to changes in efficiency and in interest rates:
where U "" is the second derivative of the utility function with respect to monitoring and U ""`0 is the optimum. A priori, the signs of these expressions are undetermined. In (23a), screening always increases in the lending rate if the first (direct) effect dominates the second (indirect) effect. This is because the term in parentheses may become negative. Monitoring declines in the deposit rate if the absolute value of the second and third terms in the parentheses exceed the first term in (23b) because of (22b). Finally, the impact of an increase in the inefficiency of banks (higher ) on screening is negative if the direct effect dominates. Financial liberalization such as, for instance, the abolition of capital controls, has thus the two effects stressed by Aizenman (1998) . On the one hand, financial liberalization increases the level of risk taking if, prior to the opening of the capital account, domestic deposit rates were below the international interest rate level. On the other hand, financial liberalization by increasing the efficiency of financial intermediation increases the amount of monitoring.
16.
In addition, we assume that the direct effects always dominate the indirect effects that arise via the induced change of ".
Under autarky, similar conditions can be derived for the banking system in the foreign country. Now, consider what happens in a two-country model if the countries move from autarky to an integrated capital market:
•
If countries are symmetric, the effect of integration is that it increases the degree of competition in domestic financial markets as the number of competitors increase from n and n*, respectively, to n + n*. Lending rates fall and deposit rates increase. Lower lending rates, in turn, could negatively affect banks' propensity to screen borrowers. Higher deposit rates, in contrast, would raise screening activities.
If countries are asymmetric, integration not only affects the number of competitors but also the relative supply of funds in each country. If, under autarky, savings are relatively scarce in the domestic economy while they are relatively abundant in the foreign economy, domestic interest rates exceed foreign interest rates. After financial liberalization, foreign capital thus flows into the domestic economy, and interest rates would converge to a common`world' level. 17 Foreign interest rates increase and domestic interest rates decline. This has positive effects on the screening activities of foreign banks and negative effects on the screening activities of domestic banks. The net effect on screening is undetermined and depends on the relative size of the economies. • Finally, the possibility to lend abroad allows hedging of macroeconomic risks if the correlation of domestic and foreign loan returns is below one. 18 Ceteris paribus (i.e. at the same level of activities), portfolio risks are thus lower than under autarky.
In summary, the implications of increased competition on risk taking are not clear-cut even in the simple model of ex-post monitoring sketched above.
Modeling information asymmetries more explicitly and allowing for ex-ante monitoring provides additional insights at the expense, however, of leaving some of the relevant factors discussed above out of consideration. Gehrig (1998) , for instance, argues that increased competition might lead to a deterioration in the allocation of resources. In his model, banks invest in screening activities to sort borrowers apart. Screening serves the two goals of increasing the probability of accepting good projects and of reducing the probability of accepting bad projects. The intensity of screening may rise or fall with the loan rate. As the loan rate declines, screening will be reduced (increased) if the marginal benefits from finding good projects exceed (are below) the benefits from avoiding bad projects. Intuitively, this is because the benefits from finding good projects are to receive a spread over the risk-free 17.
For simplicity, this argument ignores the spread between deposit and lending rates.
18.
For a similar point see Caminal and Matutes (1997a, p. 24) . Notice that the model of Aizenman assumes that only idiosyncratic risks can be diversified away.
rate. The impact of increased competition on screening incentives, on the equilibrium loan rate, and on the supply of credit depends upon the assumptions concerning the nature of competition. If, for instance, the incumbent bank is allowed to move first, higher lending rates and reduced screening may obtain. This is because the market entrant receives credit applications from an adversely selected pool of applicants and thus raises its risk premium. 19 Hence, while increased competition may put downward pressure on interest rates, at the same time it may lower the incentives of banks to collect and to process borrower information. Similarly, Caminal and Matutes (1997b) show that the welfare implications of increased competition are not uniquely determined in an asymmetric information framework but rather depend on the severance of the information problem. In situations where equilibrium credit rationing due to asymmetric information is small, perfect competition maximizes welfare. In situations, however, in which moral hazard problems are severe, monopoly banking may be optimal as monitoring incentives increase with the market power of banks.
SUMMARY
Despite the substantial efforts that have been made to level the playing field for banks in Europe and to abolish barriers to the free flow of capital, cross-border banking activities remain modest. The purpose of this paper has been to provide a framework for analyzing the links between banking activities and capital mobility which can explain this dichotomy. Its main argument has been that, due to information costs and other costs of cross-border banking activities, commercial banks' lending portfolios can be expected to exhibit a relatively strong home bias.
The insights of the paper have furthermore been used to derive implications for Euroland. Obviously, the euro affects capital flows because it eliminates exchange rate risks within Euroland. The persistence of transaction and information costs of cross-border financial flows, however, limits the impact of the euro. Three results are noteworthy:
First, the introduction of the euro will stimulate capital flows within Europe as it eliminates exchange rate risks and thus increases the incentives of (riskaverse) investors to go abroad. Instead of assuming risk aversion of banks, the lack of risk neutrality on which these results are based could be endogenized by assuming that banks have to meet capital-adequacy requirements. The effect of the euro is strengthened if other costs of cross-border transactions decline as well. This implies that gross capital flows and competition in financial markets unequivocally increase. It should be noted, however, that the impact on net
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A similar argument is made by Dell' Ariccia et al. (1999) to show that asymmetries in information create entry barriers and impede the contestability of banking markets. capital flows is undetermined because changes in market opportunities affect domestic and foreign banks alike. Second, if, in the medium to long run, financial markets in Europe further converge in terms of risks and return, incentives to hold more assets and liabilities outside the region are potentially enhanced. To what extent the market opportunities that we can measure affect banks' decisions to go abroad is unclear, however. For securities portfolios at least, we have evidence against the usefulness of the standard mean±variance framework to explain actual portfolio choices. Ultimately, it is thus an empirical question to what extent total bank portfolios exhibit a home bias just as their securities' portfolios do and to what extent market opportunities can be captured accurately in empirical work. This paper suggests that market opportunities can differ widely among investors, and that a number of the relevant parameters are difficult to observe. Among these, information costs feature prominently. Hence, while the euro eliminates the currency bias within Europe, it does not affect directly the home bias.
Third, the effects of financial market integration on the monitoring activities, on the propensity of banks to take risks, and thus on overall welfare have been discussed. Financial market integration has positive welfare implications if it enhances the efficiency of financial intermediation and if it gives banks better diversification opportunities. These effects are mitigated by the negative effects that changes in interest rates have on the propensity of banks to monitor their clients. The net effect depends on the relative size of markets, on the competitive structure of markets, and on relative demand and supply conditions. Overall, the preceding discussion provides a rationale for the need to strengthen banking supervision when allowing a greater integration of financial markets.
An important impediment to an expansion into new markets, which has not been addressed in this paper, are the fixed costs of market entry. These costs can be of a technical nature such as the costs of setting up new branch networks. More importantly, however, information asymmetries create an economic fixed cost by granting first-mover advantages to incumbent investors. Including fixed costs of market entry would thus be a straightforward extension of the present paper. Additional extensions could deal with the effects of a common monetary policy on portfolio choices of banks.
